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Abstract
One of the major challenges of conducting operations of unmanned aircraft, especially operations beyond visual line-of-
sight (BVLOS), is to make a realistic and sufficiently detailed risk assessment. An important part of such an assessment is
to identify the risk of fatalities, preferably in a quantitative way since this allows for comparison with manned aviation to
determine whether an equivalent level of safety is achievable. This work presents a method for quantifying the probability of
fatalities resulting from an uncontrolled descent of an unmanned aircraft conducting a BVLOS flight. The method is based
on a standard stochastic model, and employs a parameterized high fidelity ground impact distribution model that accounts
for both aircraft specifications, parameter uncertainties, and wind. The method also samples the flight path to create an
almost continuous quantification of the risk as a function of mission flight time. The methodology is exemplified with a 180
km flight in Danish airspace with a Penguin C aircraft.
Keywords Unmanned aircraft · Aviation safety · Stochastic modeling · Ground impact · Probability of fatality
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
As drones are becoming ubiquitous in the airspace and
as more applications of drones are focused on longer
flights the need for reliable, detailed, and quantitative risk
assessment methods is growing. While there are several
methods available (borrowing from manned aviation) for
qualitatively identifying and categorizing hazards and
mitigating risks there is comparatively little methodology
available for actually determining the probability of fatality
for a particular drone operation in particular methods
that lend themselves to reverse engineering to allow for
pinpointing how a given flight scenario could be altered to
reduce the risk. This is in large part due to the seemingly
endless list of variables that enters such a method were it to
be completely comprehensive.
This particular work is prompted by a decision by
the Danish Transport Construction and Housing Authority
 Anders la Cour-Harbo
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Denmark
in 2016 to conducts a number of trial BVLOS flight
operations in Danish airspace with the expressed intent of
using these to pave the way for routine BVLOS operations
by companies and other non-state actors. At that time
no permissions had been granted for BVLOS flight in
Denmark except for flights in Greenland and individual
flights confined to specific routes and dates. The trial flights
would be based on thorough analyzes of the risks, and
the idea was that subsequent flights would be conducted
routinely using the same risk assessment methodology.
This work presents the developed methodology. It is
based in part on a previous publication [21] applying the
methodology to a power line inspection flight done by
the Danish company Heliscope. The present work expands
and details the methodology, and the example flight has a
different and somewhat longer flight path as well as a more
professional drone platform.
1.2 PreviousWork
There are numerous works on how to conceptually approach
the challenge of determining the risk of an unmanned
aircraft flight. Much is borrowed from the world of manned
aviation that has been conducting risk management for
decades. A number of examples of risk assessments and
quantifications for unmanned aircraft include the following.
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In [4] a study for ground impact fatalities resulting
from power failure and subsequent uncontrolled glide is
presented. A study on the impact area for a general
uncontrolled descent, including a buffer zone, is presented
in [17]. A method for automatically finding a proper landing
area for an aircraft in emergency descent is shown in
[33, 34], and the ability of a fixed wing aircraft to glide
to a designated emergency landing area is presented in
[11]. In [3] a method for determining a no-thrust flight
trajectory to reach a particular landing spot is presented.
The barrier bow tie model also used in manned aviation
risk assessment is presented in [8]. A study of trajectory
models for explosive debris [29] attempts to determine the
impact point based on initial conditions. [10] addresses
the lack of an accepted framework and provides some
guidelines for how to apply existing models to manage the
risk. In [9] a comprehensive description of how to manage
the risk of unmanned aircraft operations, including ’the
systematic application of management policies, procedures
and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting,
establishing the context, and assessing, evaluating, treating,
monitoring and reviewing risk.’ This work also presents a
series of quantification of existing risks for various types
of aviation. Metrics for safety, including hazard metrics
and risks metrics are presented in [22], in [14] a software
safety case is developed, and in [13] a generic safety case
is presented based on experience with NASA unmanned
aircraft missions. The uncontrolled descent of unmanned
aircraft into populated areas have been the subject in a
number of publications. This includes [18] that investigate
larger aircraft through an equivalent level of safety analysis.
[35] specifically looks at distribution of possible impact
positions based on simulation, and [7] uses the standard
statistical setup (which is also used in this work) and
applies a normal distribution approach using aircraft glide
parameters to model the impact position.
1.3 Current Work
The aim in this work is to go beyond a qualitative approach
that merely provides a framework for risk assessment,
and instead apply a quantitative approach to determine
as accurately as possible, the level of safety for a given
flight operation using the metric ’fatalities per flight hour’,
similar to what is used in manned aviation. The modeling
of the probability of fatalities (POF) is done with a
stochastic approach similar to many of the previous works
listed above. However, the determination of the individual
probabilities in the model is done using georeferenced
probability density functions with high fidelity and (almost)
continuously along the flight path to provide not just a
single probability for the entire flight, but indeed a fatality
rate along the flight path itself. This in turn allows for
easy identification of what parameters adversely affect the
flight, with the possibility for reconfiguring the flight path
to reduce the risk of fatalities.
2Methods
The basic approach used in this work is similar to numerous
previous works, namely a stochastic model that joins
probabilities in the causal chain from drone malfunction to
a potential fatality. The specific design of this stochastic
model varies from work to work. As described in Section 2.1
below, we use a fairly simple setup, where the focus is
on the probabilities related to the ground impact. The
model is used for four different types of flight terminating
events, all described in Section 2.2, each with their own
high resolution ground impact probability density function,
see Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.4, including the effect of wind,
see Section 2.3, and associated event probability, see
Section 2.4. Rather than a priori assuming an average
population density for the entire flight (as seen in many
previous works), we employ high resolution population
density maps generated to fit the spatial extend of each event
type, see Section 2.5. We then use the stochastic model on
a (sufficiently densely) sampled flight path to determine
the probability of impacting a person as a function of the
flight path. Finally, mapping from person impact to POF
(probability of fatality) is applied based on work in the field
of forensic science, see Section 2.7.
The POF for the entire flight is determine by summing
over the flight path relative to the flight time between
each sample in the sampled flight path. This is done
separately for the different types of flight terminating events
to accommodate the varying lethality parameters associated
with the manner in which the aircraft descents in each of the
event scenarios. The is described in more detail along with
the results in Section 3.
2.1 Overall Modeling Approach
For computing the probability of fatalities during the flight
we will use this formulation similar to what is used in
several of the previous works listed in Section 1.2.
pfatality = pevent · pimpact person · pfatal impact , (1)
where pevent is the probability per time of a given event
(of which we will use four), pimpact person is the conditional
probability that given an occurrence of one of the events
that a person will be impacted as a result, and pfatal impact is
the conditional probability, given one or more persons are
impacted as a result of one of the events that this person
suffers a fatal injury. The primary focus in this work is
on the probability that a descending aircraft will impact a
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person. We also briefly treat the probability of fatalities as
a result of impact. The probability for each event occurring
during flight is measured in events per flight hour and will
be assumed known, since this probability is not the focus of
this work. Determining such probabilities is no simple task,
and in Section 2.4 is a brief discussion of the numbers used
for exemplifying this work in Section 3.
For each type of event the probability of impacting
persons on the ground is determined in 4 steps:
1. Based on a model of a given event type a probability
density function (PDF) is computed that determines the
probability of ground impact relative to the position
where the event happens.
2. This PDF is subjected to probabilistic wind, resulting in
a new, often bigger, two-dimensional PDF, which can
be interpreted as a georeferenced probabilistic impact
map.
3. This map is correlated with a population density map of
sufficient resolution for the same geographical area.
4. The resulting map is integrated over the entire area and
the result is modified to account for various factors
pertaining to each event type.
This gives a probability for a given event to result in an
impact of a person on the ground relative to the event
position. As a consequence this impact probability depends
on the type of the event, aircraft parameters, wind, and flight
path of the aircraft. In the following sections the above steps
are discussed in more detail. But first the different types
of descents are listed in Section 2.2, and presented in more
detail in Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.4.
2.2 Descent Event Types
We consider four rather different types of uncontrolled
descents of an unmanned aircraft. Each is a result of
varying types of malfunction, and each has it own model (as
indicated in step 1 above). We only consider events where
the operator has no control authority and the aircraft descent
path therefore is governed mainly by aerodynamics or the
autopilot. In either case the aircraft is not expected to return
home nor to head for any designated safe impact zone.
1. Ballistic descent This is a situation where the aircraft
has lost most of its lift, for instance by a wing breaking
off or a motor physically separating from the aircraft.
The aircraft will then enter a (close to) ballistic descent
governed solely by the aerodynamics of the crippled
aircraft.
2. Uncontrolled glide For a fixed wing aircraft this
is loss of thrust as well as loss of power for the
flight control surfaces. For a helicopter type aircraft
this event could be loss of thrust on the main rotor
with an autopiloted autorotation descent. In any case
the airframe is structurally intact and the aircraft is
assumed to enter a descent path governed by the glide
ratio/autorotation descent angle as well as wind. For a
fixed wing the deflection surfaces are assumed to be in
a close to neutral position such as to give a straight or
perhaps slightly curved glide.
3. Parachute descent This is a descent with a fully
deployed parachute. It is assumed that the deployment
is a result of a malfunction detection, and thus that
motor(s) are turned off giving a descent path based
solely on the aerodynamic properties of the parachute.
4. Flyaway This is complete loss of operator control
authority of the aircraft while the autopilot continuous
to operate in a mode that maintains the stability of the
flight. The motion of the aircraft is controlled by the
autopilot, and it may fly to its maximum range in any
direction, including vertically up.
One can envision additional failure scenarios such as a
spin due to a faulty actuator, loss of a vital sensor that
deprives the aircraft of any useful navigation, and so on.
We assume that each of the four above listed events will
happen with a probability independent of where the aircraft
is along the flight path. The impact point on the ground of
a descending aircraft is determined by the descent models
relative to the event point. The event point is defined as
the spatial location of the aircraft at the time it suffers a
malfunction that gives raise to one of the above scenarios.
Depending on the context the event point may refer to the
projection of the point onto the ground (i.e. zero AGL). The
ground impact point position is modeled with a number of
uncertainties that reasonably may affect the descent, and
these are described below in more detail.
2.2.1 Ballistic Descent
The ballistic descent is modeled as described in [19]. The
model has a second order dependence on speed and acts solely
under influence of gravity and drag. The flight velocity
prior to the event is based on the georeferenced flight path.
The model for the ballistic descent is a multiple stage for-
mulation that includes altitude, mass, drag coefficient, and
frontal area. The descent path is roughly a second order
polynomial modified to account for the aerodynamic prop-
erties of the aircraft. It also has probabilistic assumptions on
the horizontal and vertical initial speeds as well as on the
drag coefficient. The output of this model is a 1D PDF with
the probability of the aircraft impacting the ground a given
distance away from the event point and along a line coincid-
ing with the traveling compass direction of the aircraft. The
model is much too comprehensive to be reiterated here, so
do see the reference for further details.
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2.2.2 Uncontrolled Glide
The uncontrolled glide assumes the aircraft is descending as
a glider. The aircraft is without thrust and in an aerodynamic
equilibrium configuration with actuators in neutral or close
to neutral positions (that is, no banking with ailerons and no
turning with the rudder). The horizontally traveled distance
per vertically descended distance is called the glide ratio γ ,
and in this work is given as a normally distributed variable
with mean equal to the estimated glide ratio and a variance
to accommodate for variations in elevator deflection angle
and variation in drag due to possible modifications of the
aircraft to accommodate missions sensors. The horizontal
distance x traveled (in the wind frame) in an uncontrolled
glide from altitude y is simply x(y) = γy and the drop
time is tdrop(y) = x(y)/vg, where vg is the horizontal glide
speed. To get the ground impact PDF the wind variations as
described in Section 2.3 are applied.
2.2.3 Parachute Descent
Descent with a parachute is essentially a vertical drop in the
wind frame. We assume that the parachute is deployed in
case of a detected emergency situation with a short delay of
d seconds, and that the parachute once triggered will deploy
instantaneously and reduce the horizontal velocity to zero
instantly (in the wind frame). While this obviously in not the
case in real life the distance traveled during the deployment
and deceleration phase is negligible in relation to the impact
area for a parachuted descent. Assuming a standard second
order drag model. The drop time from altitude y is
tdrop = y
vdrop
= y
√
ApCd,p
2mg
, (2)
where m is mass, g is gravitational constant, Ap is parachute
area, and Cd,p is the parachute drag coefficient. In this
work the latter is a probabilistic value. Note that if the drop
speed vdrop for a given parachute configuration is known the
formula is very simple.
As with the uncontrolled glide the ground impact
probability density function (PDF) is achieved by applying
the wind variations as described in Section 2.3 plus
offsetting the result according to the flight direction and
deployment delay.
2.2.4 Flyaway
A flyaway event will potentially take the aircraft to the limit
of its range, which dependents largely on the fuel left and
on the wind speed and direction. The model for a flyaway is
in this work composed of two contributions.
First, the probability of ground impact is assumed to
decreases linearly with distance from the event point,
reaching zero at the maximum range. The simplicity of
this model is primarily due to lack of knowledge of how a
flyaway will progress. On the one hand if a flyaway most
often will continue until there is no fuel left the probability
of ground impact should be relatively higher close to the
circumference of the flight range circle. On the other hand
if the flyaway is not in a straight line, but rather more with
random movements, and the ground impact point therefore
can be assumed to be equally likely at any distance from
the event point, the probability should decrease with the
square of the distance. As a compromise a linear relation is
chosen. This probability is then modified according to the
wind speed and direction. Mathematically, this is modeled as
f (p) = max
[
0, Rmax − ‖p‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
linear decrease
+ cos
(
arctan
pN
pE
+ θ
)‖p‖
vc︸ ︷︷ ︸
modification according to wind
]
,
(3)
where θ is the wind average direction, Rmax is the maximum
flight range given the available fuel, vc is the aircraft cruise
airspeed, and p = (pN, pE) is a north-east position relative
to the event point.
Second, a probability is added that the aircraft will
ascend more or less vertically, either as ’helicopter climb’
or spiraling up with a fixed wing. This causes the ground
impact point to be close to the event point, and this part
is modeled as a normal distribution for distance from the
event point with mean 0 and standard deviation σva (vertical
ascend) from the event point, and uniformly in direction.
That is, the impact PDF becomes
g(p) = 1
2πσ 2va
exp
(
−‖p‖
2
2σ 2va
)
. (4)
The two scenarios as linearly combined with a relation factor
β, such that β = 0.5 makes each contributor with equal
probability. The resulting ground impact PDF becomes
Pflyaway(p) = (1 − β) f (p)∫∫ ∞
−∞ f (p)
+ βg(p) . (5)
An example of the resulting 2D PDF is shown in Fig. 1.
2.3Wind
The influence of wind is significant for all four event
types. Ballistic descent, uncontrolled glide, and parachute
descent are all modeled directly in the wind frame, while
the flyaway event is not directly assumed to be in the wind
frame, but the wind speed does in Eq. 3 affect the ability
of the aircraft to fly distances in certain directions. Since
the knowledge about the wind for a given flight will vary
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Fig. 1 An example of a flyaway ground impact PDF. The upper graph
shows the 2D PDF in log scale color and georeferenced relative to
the event location. The lower graph shows the maximum value along
the north axis, also in log scale. Wind is heading 0.43 rad (circa east-
north-east) at 5 m/s. The aircraft and parameters used are described in
Section 3.1
somewhat depending on the circumstances we propose to
use one of three wind models:
1. Direction and speed modeled with normal distributions.
2. Direction unknown (modeled uniformly), speed mod-
eled with normal distribution.
3. Direction and speed based on historic data.
The first option is useful for missions in a particular
geographical area where some wind statistics is available,
and for computation just prior to a flight where the actual
wind might be available. The second options is useful for
more generic scenarios where the geographical locations is
yet to be determined. The third option applies to scenarios
that take place at a known location at a known time, and
where historic data for a the given time period (say a
particular week or month) is available.
The models for the ballistic descent, uncontrolled glide,
and parachute descent all provide a series of drop times (the
time it takes the aircraft to reach the ground from the given
flight altitude) resulting from the probabilistic nature of the
models. For all three models the offset caused by the wind
is dependent solely on these drop times, since all other aero-
dynamic properties are already accounted for in the models.
One way to practically compute the effect of the wind
is as follows. The range of possible drop times is sampled
as {tk}k=0,...,n and for each drop time tk a sampled
georeferenced PDF is generated as a matrix Mk representing
the probability of the aircraft doing a purely vertical drop
in the wind frame to impact the ground at the geolocation
represented by each entry in the matrix. The ground grid
of the PDF (sampling density) should match the event type
and the population density matrix that appears later in the
computation (see Section 2.5). The drop times comes from
the individual models with a set of probabilities {pk}k=0,...,n
that gives the probability of each drop time. Thus, to
generate the wind effect on the individual model, we simply
sum up the PDF matrices as
M =
n∑
k=0
pkMk , (6)
while keeping score of the georeference of each matrix
such that the resulting matrix M is also georeferenced. This
approach is particularly useful for flights where the same
drop times occurs often, since the Mk matrices need not be
recalculated as long as the drop times are within the same
range.
To demonstrate how the wind effect is in practice applied
to a descent an example using the parachute descent is given
in Fig. 2. The procedure of applying wind to an uncontrolled
glide and a ballistic descent is essentially the same.
2.4 Probability of Events
The events that render the aircraft uncontrollable and even-
tually lead to a uncontrolled descent each has a probability
attached to them. These probabilities are difficult to estimate
and difficult to measure (as that would require many flight
hours on precisely the same setup). For the computations in
this work we simply assume given values that per aviation
tradition are measured in ’per flight hour’. The probabili-
ties used here are estimates based on the works of others (see
below) as well as the experience of persons at the insti-
tutions listed in Acknowledgements. The event probability
appears in the probability computation in Eq. 1 as a scalar.
As a consequence the effect of changing the event probabil-
ity is simply a scaling of the resulting probability.
The probability of a flight terminating malfunction on
an unmanned aircraft has been studied by a number of
groups. A reliability assessment of an Ultra Stick 120 is
made in [15] and [16] using failure mode effect and analysis
(FMEA), with particular attention to the control surfaces
and servos. No specific probabilities for an uncontrolled
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Fig. 2 Example of wind affecting a parachute descent: The graph on
the left shows in black the normal distribution N(μ = 1.14, σ 2 = 0.2)
of Cd,p, sampled 40 times from −2 to +2 standard deviations, and in
blue the drop times associated with the same 40 Cd,p sample values
from an altitude of 80 m with a parachute area of 12.5 m2 and air-
craft mass of 16 kg. On the right is shown the wind PDF for three of
the drop times (marked in red on the blue graph on the left), using
wind direction distributed as N(0.44, 0.17) (equal to compass heading
65◦ and standard deviation of 10◦) and speed as N(7, 2). The fourth
graph shows a linear combination as given by Eq. 6, and this would
be the non-offset (see Section 2.2.3 on parachute descent) georefer-
enced ground impact PDF for a parachute descent relative to the event
position at (0, 0)
descent are provided, but are considered to be high. In
[24] probabilities related to military unmanned aircraft are
reported, and the probability of a flight terminating event
is in the order of 10−4 – 10−2 per flight hour, with the
probability for smaller aircraft being somewhat higher that
for the larger aircraft. A group of students showed in
[26] using FMEA based on component failure rates that
their Ultra Stick 120 has on average 2.17 catastrophic
(flight terminating) failures per 100 flight hours. The types
of failures considered relate to the ballistic descent and
uncontrolled glide in the present work. In [27] the same
group showed how a dedicated reconstruction of the aircraft
based on a fault tree analysis could theoretically reduce
the failure rate by a factor 20, and they were able to
implement changes to the physical aircraft to achieve a
catastrophic failure rate of 0.76 per 100 flight hours.
Actuators and control surfaces are investigated in [30] and
[31] where the probability of having an uncontrollable
aircraft is modeled using a servo fault detection algorithm.
In [23] a method for estimating mechanical failure rates
of small unmanned aircraft is presented, and an example
is provided based on the 25 kg SPAARO aircraft. This
example explicitly lists the used probabilities for failures of
servos and deflection surfaces as well as failures of engine
and battery. These probabilities were provided by two
experienced RC pilots. In addition probabilities of failure
for a wing bolt and main spar are theoretically derived. The
resulting failure rate for the aircraft (covering the ballistic
and uncontrolled glide events) is 0.19 failures per flight
hour. With suggested improvements for the engine, wing
bolt, servos, and redundant control surfaces the failure can
be reduced to 2.8 failure per 100 flight hours (equivalent
to 36 hours between failures). Note that this includes non-
catastrophic failures, where the aircraft may be able to
return home.
2.5 People Density
Density of people on the ground is the main factor in the
probability of impacting a person in the event of a crash,
and for BVLOS flight operations that stretches over longer
distances variation in people density can be significant
during the flight. The example flight presented in Section 3
is specifically chosen to include this feature. As the impact
areas for each event change over the course of the flight as
well as in between flight as a result of changes in altitude, wind
conditions, flight speeds etc. it is important to represent the
actual people density with a reasonably fine resolution. For
this reason it is insufficient to assume a fixed people density,
even for smaller geographical areas, and if such assumption
is made the resulting POF may be misleading and changes
in the flight planning that might actually have an impact on
the fatality rate may go unnoticed.
The impact area for different types of descents varies
hugely, i.e. a ballistic descent is typically close to the event
position, whereas a flyaway can result in a descent hundreds
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of kilometers from the event position. Consequently, for
some events the resolution of the people density map must
be fairly high to give accurate estimates of the person impact
probability, while for other events the resolution can be
more coarse and still give accurate results.
A list of geographical coordinates of all addresses in
Denmark is publicly available and this has been used to
generate people density maps with varying resolution to
fit the different types of descents. While a fine grained
resolution will of course work for any type of event
the computation time grows significantly, so maps are
generated that suits the spatial extend of the impact area for
each type of event. In Fig. 3 are shown three examples of
such maps.
While these maps do show where people live they
obviously do not show where people actually are. As
this information is evidently very difficult to obtain we
will make the assumptions that people are, with some
probability, in the vicinity of their home, and with some
probability are outside exposed to a small unmanned aircraft
potentially descending. Inspired by [12] an appropriate
probability of people being exposed is around 30%. This
is also referred to as the shelter factor. We will also
assume that the number of people associated with each
address is equal to the average number of people in a
Danish household. This number is 5.75 million people
divided by 2.65 million households, equal to 2.17 people
per household. The number of addresses is 3.3 million as
some addresses are not households, but rather businesses
and industry. The density map used in this work is not
adjusted to account for this.
2.6 Probability of Impact Persons
For a given event type we now have a ground impact
probability density function (PDF) measured in meters
relative to (0, 0). By offsetting this PDF relative to the
coordinates of the event point we obtain a georeferenced
impact map in WGS84 coordinates (latitude and longitude).
This PDF matrix is then entry-wise multiplied with the
population density map (appropriately sampled matrix D)
for the same area and the result is a map of the probability
of impacting a 1 m2 large person, since our population
density is measured in people per m2. We assume that a
person takes up a particular area Aperson that depends on
the expected impact angle, and this value is multiplied onto
the result. Additionally, it is multiplied with the shelter
factor S, which accounts for the probability that a person
is sheltered by being indoors, under a tree, in a car etc.
In this work we assume a fairly high probability of being
sheltered (typically indoors), since the population density
map is based on addresses where people live. This will then
provide the probability pimpact person of impacting a person
(see Eq. 1 above) given a particular event at the given event
point. The computation can be formulated as
pimpact person = S · Aperson ·
∑
latitude
longitude
(PDF ◦ D) , (7)
where ◦ is the Hadamard product and · is the scalar product.
2.7 Probability of Fatality When Impacted
When a drone impacts a human there is a probability that
the impact will inflect injuries that will result in a fatality.
Determining this probability for a given person and a given
drone is not simple, partly because of the many different
ways the impact can occur, and partly because the easily
determined parameters, such a speed and mass, do not have
a simple correlation to injury severity, because the human
body reacts differently depending on the impacted body
part, and the fact that injuries primarily relate to how fast
and where the kinetic energy is dissipated in the body, not
the kinetic energy of the impacting object itself. For a review
of literature on drone-like human injuries, see [20] and [2].
A number of reasonably accurate and empirically verified
Fig. 3 From left to right people density maps with resolutions of 1 km,
100 m, and 25 m. The color scale is the same and goes from 0 (white)
through 1 (dark blue) to 40.000 person/km2 (dark red). Note how the
density tends to grow with increased resolution due to the same number
of people being registered in still smaller squares. Semi-transparent
topographical information is overlaid; roads are brown, urban areas
in dark yellow, forest in green, and municipality border in black. The
town in the center of view is Thorsø
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models have been developed. One model that fits well to a
drone (chest) impact scenario is [32] which uses a lumped-
mass thoracic model to develop a VC parameter, where V is
thorax compression velocity and C is compression relative
to chest depth. The VC parameter for a given impact maps
well to injury severity.
For this work we have chosen to use the blunt criterion
(BC) from [6] for impacts at relatively high speeds (covering
ballistic descent, uncontrolled glide, and flyaway) and the
area weighted kinetic energy methods (AWKE) from [2]
(covering parachute descent). It would be relatively easy
to substitute these for other methods, since the modeling
approach used here provides all necessary parameters, such
as mass, speed, impact angle, impact area, etc.
2.7.1 Blunt Criterion
The blunt criterion (BC) is useful because it does map
kinetic energy to injury severity. It is defined as
BC = ln E
W 1/3T D
, (8)
where E is kinetic energy, W is mass of impacted object,
T is thickness of the body wall (in cm), and D is diameter
of impacting object (in cm). According to [28] T = kW 1/3
with k = 0.6 for females and k = 0.7 for males, and
according to [5] we have AIS = 1.33 · BC + 0.6. And by
interpolating the fatality rates normally associated with the
AIS scale [1] we can now map kinetic energy to fatality rate.
Note that an adaption of BC to impacts of drones is done
in [25], where a generic drone design is used to develop
formulas specifically for thorax and head impacts. It does
not map all the way to fatality rate, though.
2.7.2 Area Weight Kinetic Energy
This method is an adaption done by [2] of earlier work to
better represent the posture of a person when impacted, and
also maps kinetic energy to POF. Unlike the BC criterion
it does not account for the size of the impacted area, and
Table 1 Area weighted kinetic energy from Table 15 in [2] (with KE
in SI units)
POF Kinetic energy [J]
0.01 43
0.10 66
0.30 92
0.50 114
0.90 194
as such is more suitable for impacts of larger areas. The
actual mapping used in the present work is a cubic spline
with a derivative equal to zero at the end knots applied to
the numbers in Table 1, which in turn is copied from [2].
Figure 4 shows the maps from impact speed to POF for
the Penguin C aircraft. The impact speeds for the example
flight ranges from 4.5 m/s for parachute descent to over 20
m/s for ballistic impacts. As expected the lethality of the
Penguin C aircraft is close to 1 for any descent type.
2.8 Approximation of WGS84 Coordinates
While a population density map would typically be in
geographical latitude and longitude coordinate system
the impact PDFs are in a local north-east coordinate
system, since the models operate with a relative distance
measure in Euclidean metric. In order to multiply those
two maps a conversion of either one is required. In this
work we convert the impact PDF to latitude/longitude
coordinates. This conversion does require a significant
amount of computation as the location of each entry
in the PDF matrix must be converted. A very fast and
simple approximation is to simply linearly interpolate
lat/lon coordinates between two diagonally opposite lat/lon
corner coordinates of the PDF. This approximation is fairly
accurate for a PDF spanning single digit kilometers, in the
sense that the distance error between the true position and
the approximated position (measured as Euclidean distance)
is somewhat smaller than population density resolution.
However, as the PDF size grows the error soon becomes
significant. Figure 5 shows the difference between a full
conversion and interpolation for two example PDF sizes.
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Fig. 4 Mapping from impact speed to POF for the 16 kg Penguin
C aircraft. Specifications for the aircraft and the simulated flight are
found in Table 2 and 3. The impact speeds are derived from the event
models. The blue curve is the AWKE model (used for parachute), the
red curve is BC for impacts with an intact aircraft and impact area of
25 cm2 (used for uncontrolled glide and flyaway), and the yellow curve
is for ballistic descent, where the front area is somewhat bigger, here
at 200 cm2
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Fig. 5 Difference between
linearly interpolating latitude
and longitude coordinates for
PDF matrix (red) and full
conversion of all PDF matrix
entries (blue). The left graphs
show the distance error between
the two methods, and the right
graphs show the true
latitude/longitude grids along
with the approximation grids.
The upper graphs are for a 20
km by 20 km area, while the
lower graphs are for a 300 km
by 300 km area. The center
point in all graphs is the first
waypoint of the example flight
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3 Results
The proposed method for quantifying POF lends itself to
a wide range of unmanned aircraft flight scenarios. It does
require reasonably good knowledge on a number of aspects
on the flight, including aircraft specifications, a fairly fine-
grained population density map, specific flight path, and
assumptions on the probability of the flight terminating
events. In this section the method is demonstrated using an
imaginary, albeit quite realistic flight scenario where all the
above parameters are assumed available, either as available
specifications or as reasonable estimates. It seems sapient to
Fig. 6 Penguin C fixed wing aircraft from UAV Factory. Photo by
manufacturer
assume that the risk associated with the example flight will
be no different for flight conducted with the same aircraft at
other geographical locations as long as these locations have
parameters similar to the one used for the example flight.
3.1 Aircraft and Flight Path
The example flight is a transport scenario where a Penguin
C aircraft, shown in Fig. 6, is operating a service between
Table 2 Imaginary Penguin C aircraft specifications
Flight time 4 h
Mass (from aircraft spec sheet) 16 kg
Cruise speed (from aircraft spec sheet) 21 m/s
Glide speed 16 m/s
Glide ratio N(μ = 12, σ = 2)
Drag coefficient at ballistic descent N(μ = 0.9, σ = 0.2)
Area for drag at ballistic descent 0.1 m2
Area for person impact at ballistic descent 200 cm2
Area for person impact at glide and fly-away 50 cm2
Drag coefficient at parachute descent N(μ = 1.14, σ = 0.2)
Parachute area 12.57 m2
Parachute deployment time 2 s
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the cities of Aalborg and Kolding, Denmark. The flight
is about 180 km and will be conducted BVLOS, and the
POF is computed for a specific flight path starting north
of Kolding and ending west of Aalborg. Most necessary
parameters are not publicly available for this aircraft, so
some are either estimated or assigned plausible values for
the purpose of demonstrating the proposed methods. The
used parameters are given in Table 2.
3.1.1 Flight Path
The flight path is a route from Kolding to Aalborg specified
with 68 waypoints in latitude and longitude in WGS84
coordinates. The altitude AGL is mostly 100 meters (being
the maximum altitude for flights outside urban areas in
Denmark), but varies in some places to demonstrate the
consequence of flights at higher or lower altitudes. The path
is over areas with very low (forest areas) as well as fairly
high (city area) population density, also for demonstration
purposes. The flight path is shown in Fig. 7, including two
excerpts over areas with low and high population density.
The altitude of the path is shown in Fig. 8. The flight path
is also given in WGS84 coordinates in Table 5 as ’Original
path’.
3.2 Flight Path Sampling
For the purpose of computing POF during the flight the
entire path is sampled at equidistant points between the
waypoints under the assumption that the flight path consists
of straight lines between WPs. The sample density is chosen
in relation to the geographical extend of the probable impact
area for each of the events described in Section 2.2. For
small impact areas a higher sampling density is chosen such
as to capture any change in population density that occurs
along the path.
The size of the probable impact area for the ballistic event
is in the order of 100 m by 100 m, so the flight path sampling
density for this event is set to 25 m, and the population
density map used is 25 m by 25 m. A more dense sampling
Fig. 7 The example flight path extending from Kolding to Aalborg,
Demark. The upper image shows the entire flight path (north is left).
The lower left image shows the flight path over a densely populated
area (city of Silkeborg) between WP 38 and 41. The lower right shows
the flight path over a thinly populated area between WP 32 and 34.
The blue triangles show the sampling of the flight path for the ballis-
tic descent, and the numbers shows an enumeration of those sample
points. The two lower images both have views toward NNW
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Fig. 8 Flight path altitude as AGL. The read dots show the location of the waypoins
of the flight path than this only gives negligibly different
results. Similar considerations lead to the sample density of
the parachute descent and uncontrolled glide to be set at 50
and 100 m, respectively, with population density samplings
of 100 m by 100 m and 250 m by 250 m, respectively. The
flight path sample density for a flyaway is 1000 m. The wind
is assumed to be normally distributed in direction and speed.
The actual parameters used in the simulation are listed in
Table 3.
Examples of georeferenced impact areas for each of the
event types are shown in Fig. 9 for ballistic, uncontrolled
glide, and parachute, and for flyaway in Fig. 10. All four
examples use the same event point, namely WP 39 over
the city of Silkeborg. Notice how the size of the areas vary
significantly, and all show signs of the east-north-east wind
direction.
3.3 Computing Probability of Fatality Along Flight
Path
For each flight path sample point the probability of fatal
injury pfatal impact can now be computed. First we use Eq. 7
to determine the probability of impacting a person. Based
on the descent parameters for each event type, given by
Table 4, the lethality estimation described in Section 2.7 is
applied to determine the POF given that an event occurs.
This probability is then used in Eq. 1 along with the event
probability pevent to give the unconditional POF pfatality.
Table 3 Flight specifications
Flight distance 180 km
Flight altitude 0 to 150 m AGL
Number of WPs 68
Wind speed N(7, 3)
Wind direction N(0.44, 0.17)
Flyaway – long short ratio β 0.01
Flyaway – short distance sigma σva 4000 m
This probability is valid for that brief period of time where
the aircraft is in the vicinity of the flight path sample
point; for computational purposes we will assume that this
probability is valid for the flight from one flight sample
point to the next. Table 4 lists the time distance between path
samples for each event type assuming cruise speed.
The entire time-varying POF for each event type is shown
in Fig. 11. It is immediately obvious that there are distinct
differences as well as similarities between the four graphs.
Each graph is discussed in the following four subsections,
highlighting similarities as well as differences.
3.3.1 Ballistic Descent
The ballistic descent is targeting a relatively small impact
area with a comparatively high probability, as is exemplified
in Fig. 9. At the same time the resolution of the population
density map is small, and because the flight is mostly over
a thinly populated area many of the (small) cells in this map
have zero density. Consequently, for many of the sampled
event points along the flight path the impact area for the
ballistic descent only covers zero density cells, resulting in
zero POF. However, since the y axis is in logarithmic scale
this is not evident from the graph. Whenever the aircraft
passes over a farm or cluster of houses, the probability
increases briefly, which causes ’spikes’ in the POF graph.
The transit over Silkeborg at WP 37 through 41 gives a more
prominent increase in POF.
3.3.2 Uncontrolled Glide
The uncontrolled glide impact area is somewhat larger
(roughly one to two order of magnitudes depending on flight
altitude) than that of the ballistic descent, and the population
density map used is comparatively more coarse, and as a
consequences the POF graph is less spiky. Since the flight
path is over mainland Denmark the population density may
be low, but virtually never zero for the impact PDF covering
tens of thousands of square meters. This results in the POF
graph always being non-zero, albeit mostly with quite low
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Fig. 9 Impact PDFs for ballistic descent (smallest area), uncontrolled
glide (largest area), and parachute descent (tear drop shaped). Event
location for the three impact PDFs is all at WP 39 (marked as
subsampling no. 1). The blue triangles mark the uncontrolled glide
subsampling (i.e. for every 100 m of flight). The red line is the flight
direction and the green line is the mean wind direction. The highly
transparent white rectangles show the sizes of the PDF matrices and
they are geographically aligned NS-EW. The white line shows the lin-
ear interpolation between waypoints. The city is Silkeborg, Denmark
and the view direction is north-east
values. The flight path was chosen to pass over a few towns
(which are easily identified as short increases in the graph)
as well as Silkeborg, which gives the largest increase in
POF. Notice how this increase is located earlier in time than
the corresponding increase for the ballistic descent. This is
caused by the uncontrolled glide impacting 1000 to 1500
m ahead of the event point, whereas the ballistic descent is
only 50-100 m ahead.
Fig. 10 Impact PDF for a flyaway event for the aircraft fully fueled at
the start of the flight. The event location is WP 39. There is a very small
yellow zone in the middle of the concentric contour lines, which is the
vertical flyaway zone. But it is too small to be visible in this view. The
highly transparent white rectangle shows the size of the PDF matrix
and the white line shows the entire flight path. The view direction is
due north
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Table 4 Model parameters
Ballistic UG Parachute Flyaway
Person area Aperson [m2/person] 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.6
Shelter factor S 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3
Flight path sample distance [m] 25 100 50 1000
Flight time per sample [s] 1.2 4.8 2.4 48
Impact PDF cell size [m×m] 5×5 50×50 20×20 1000×1000
Pop. density map resolution [m×m] 25×25 250×250 100×100 1000×1000
Grid approximation (Section 2.8) Yes Yes Yes No
Injury model BC BC AWKE BC
Event probability [per flight hour] 1/125 1/150 1/100 1/200
3.3.3 Parachute Descent
The parachute descent impacts a tear drop shaped area
stretching from close to the event point and in the mean wind
direction. This is clearly seen in Fig. 9. This impact area is
in the vicinity of the ballistic descent impact area and we
also do see some correlation between the POF graph for the
two events. The parachute graph is a little less spiky because
the impact area is somewhat bigger, and there are a few
places where the parachute POF is indeed zero, most promi-
nently between WP 31 and 33, which is over forest area.
3.3.4 Flyaway
The flyaway impact area is quite large, as can be seen in
Fig. 10, covering hundreds of square kilometers. Therefore
it changes relatively little during the flight. The model for
the flyaway includes the possibility of a vertical ascent (and
subsequently descent ’close’ to the event point), and this
noticeably affects the POF when passing over Silkeborg,
where a slight increase in the POF is seen in the graph. The
path sample density is 1000 m, significantly higher than
the three previous graphs, and this shows up as a distinct
stair case pattern in the graph. Some of the slightly larger
steps in the graph occurs at waypoints, and is caused by
the maximum flight distance being updated (the maximum
flight distance is reduced a little as a little less fuel is
available) only at every waypoint, not at every sample point
along the flight path. While this is visually a bit confusing
it has negligible effect on the resulting average POF. Note
that this graph is in linear scale.
At the bottom of this graph is also shown the time
position of the 68 waypoints.
3.4 Joint Probability of Fatality
For each of the four events the average POF is computed
by averaging over all flight path samples relative to the
flight time for each sample. These four average values are
summed to give the total probability for the entire flight.
The figures are shown in Table 6 as ’POF original path’.
It is evident from Fig. 11 that the POF can be reduce
somewhat by avoiding the obvious higher population
density areas. To quantify the effect of this the flight path
has been modified slightly to circumvent all such areas. The
WGS84 coordinates are listed in Table 5 as ’Modified path’
and the resulting POF are shown in Table 6. Essentially,
all the larger ’spikes’ in Fig. 11 have been removed, and
as expected the three event types with relative small impact
areas have significantly reduced POF, while the flyaway
event is largely unaffected.
It is important to note that the probabilities given in
Table 6 are rather approximative for two reasons; 1) they
are based on a series of assumptions with varying degrees of
accuracy and obviously the end result is no more accurate
than these assumptions (see Section 3.5), and 2) the joint
probability should have been conditional in the sense that
the probability of an event at any given time is conditional
on any other event has not yet occurred. For instance, a
flyaway at a given time is conditional on the aircraft not
having experienced a ballistic descent prior to this time.
However, as all the probabilities are indeed relative small
the error caused by summing the individual event POF
is negligible compared to the inaccuracy caused by the
previously mentioned assumptions.
3.5 Interpretation and Validity of Results
The list of assumptions enabling the computation of the
probabilities shown in Fig. 11 and in Table 6 is fairly long
and holds values that are estimates based on work done by
others on other drones, some estimates are based on general
knowledge about small unmanned aircraft, and some of
the parameters are pure guesswork and remains unproven.
It would be valuable to determine how these uncertainties
affect the uncertainty of the results. For some parameters
this is easy, such as the event probability that affects the
POF merely by scaling (as evident from Eq. 1), but other
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Table 5 List of WGS84 coordinates for original and modified flight paths
Original path Modified path
WP# Latitude Longitude AGL Latitude Longitude AGL
1 55.554545030296 9.479322401507 20 55.554545030296 9.479322401507 20
2 55.554680578851 9.476749600627 40 55.554680578851 9.476749600627 40
3 55.556493899011 9.472955222674 60 55.556493899011 9.472955222674 60
4 55.560772780031 9.469421045602 80 55.560772780031 9.469421045602 80
5 55.571128233980 9.467951534842 100 55.571128233980 9.467951534842 100
6 55.580554097762 9.477530540320 100 55.580699042913 9.468063130546 100
7 55.595347595425 9.475706907721 100 55.595678117696 9.469625061952 100
8 55.609464552686 9.467568767644 100 55.609464552686 9.467568767644 100
9 55.622126964138 9.457714905384 100 55.622126964138 9.457714905384 100
10 55.640033838008 9.450405736055 100 55.640033838008 9.450405736055 100
11 55.653584519126 9.455903118340 100 55.653584519126 9.455903118340 100
12 55.671544872137 9.462502164140 100 55.671544872137 9.462502164140 100
13 55.690793023267 9.452169109227 110 55.689231538618 9.443633439260 100
14 55.697841276171 9.451795763291 130 55.695241051100 9.432198928936 100
15 55.705155424780 9.452008039724 150 55.701426874904 9.424480457267 100
16 55.713342716316 9.452635295842 130 55.712808999641 9.419787857672 100
17 55.718737589467 9.453860786061 110 55.721262024323 9.424097473257 100
18 55.724870646620 9.458778087963 100 55.729548739524 9.436538591473 100
19 55.736882932082 9.458950488854 100 55.739473049343 9.448720466326 100
20 55.754978057789 9.456697504419 100 55.754043339766 9.460182361401 100
21 55.766389861392 9.457419201889 100 55.769330749294 9.460182360621 100
22 55.783061055668 9.463099739267 100 55.783061055668 9.463099739267 100
23 55.796311267866 9.471218257102 100 55.796303809176 9.462284853005 100
24 55.809546318692 9.481585537150 100 55.812623312168 9.457191361399 100
25 55.826623171859 9.489901805754 100 55.829171660912 9.453610115704 100
26 55.842014846903 9.487857577784 70 55.844880820540 9.450562706138 100
27 55.850530209601 9.487860863523 70 55.857056359990 9.446506570546 100
28 55.867137492954 9.485695418246 100 55.872292575249 9.446434322188 100
29 55.881305880608 9.482237070355 100 55.890727301460 9.453352909541 100
30 55.899312437586 9.479473303976 100 55.912650991875 9.461405525529 100
31 55.942643730522 9.469745001365 100 55.942643730522 9.469745001365 100
32 55.969530410357 9.479280816704 40 55.969530410357 9.479280816704 100
33 56.017601083823 9.466256699438 40 56.017601083823 9.466256699438 100
34 56.057808129637 9.480695780839 40 56.057808129637 9.480695780839 100
35 56.090264077707 9.508752252898 40 56.087703424994 9.473621132251 100
36 56.115225760456 9.536264547242 100 56.114624114342 9.451205789754 100
37 56.146749328129 9.541634146861 120 56.133894803581 9.429811971342 100
38 56.155659416951 9.542015090368 120 56.156304535315 9.424143409130 100
39 56.167188110346 9.541514910841 120 56.168864836335 9.430687257542 100
40 56.177444408361 9.542412101968 120 56.184127386842 9.439530367466 100
41 56.196028064574 9.542890432537 100 56.207690305472 9.449741685742 100
42 56.225366530587 9.523635840514 100 56.234891586695 9.490194574182 100
43 56.249117014960 9.543181285937 100 56.259444632292 9.518195370221 100
44 56.283498377364 9.583744503554 100 56.287405200628 9.538855144080 100
45 56.299891685624 9.582816893589 100 56.316228368282 9.543671729848 100
46 56.317290167629 9.588831148520 100 56.330044984775 9.551193442068 100
47 56.332442655605 9.584268393221 100 56.346184198871 9.557743379279 100
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Table 5 (continued)
Original path Modified path
WP# Latitude Longitude AGL Latitude Longitude AGL
48 56.345701312115 9.595420808242 100 56.361723383614 9.560967098869 100
49 56.369226580481 9.590604318891 100 56.387649271489 9.565681966600 100
50 56.409898900464 9.568224728466 100 56.409898900464 9.568224728466 100
51 56.467584399225 9.567370972179 100 56.467734298736 9.553529311465 100
52 56.521781127382 9.566187195270 100 56.524526113619 9.547828241131 100
53 56.581812248122 9.583664030196 100 56.580764311815 9.574936605005 100
54 56.650079997414 9.604148586681 100 56.648393997396 9.588440791549 100
55 56.695438580383 9.606018831192 100 56.694146568537 9.591645889909 100
56 56.732806256253 9.627111567328 100 56.754781558791 9.598422967079 100
57 56.827334617828 9.674385020774 100 56.827334617828 9.674385020774 100
58 56.900797285025 9.695550478188 100 56.900797285025 9.695550478188 100
59 56.947371874912 9.698767611715 100 56.947371874912 9.698767611715 100
60 56.981525482529 9.723820847486 100 56.970595106677 9.733897626722 100
61 56.993511801990 9.761587953247 80 56.991496077850 9.760649326777 80
62 56.991051020372 9.816935870554 60 57.013003165267 9.762891470667 60
63 56.995523555285 9.840415594179 60 57.024691896377 9.772740225473 60
64 57.001745474616 9.853392191806 40 57.042973948529 9.783842662825 40
65 57.014167025759 9.853595038740 40 57.047911099505 9.800979436634 40
66 57.023354417254 9.849206649568 40 57.046613711923 9.818299119874 40
67 57.034709513318 9.848430778663 20 57.044711999436 9.837013427784 20
68 57.043000539486 9.855678708563 0 57.043000539486 9.855678708563 0
parameters enter the computations in a highly nonlinear
fashion (such as wind direction and speed). Therefore the
effect of varying such parameters is not easy to determine. A
study of the sensitivity of the individual parameters remains
as future work.
The substantial uncertainty aside the estimated parame-
ters in Table 3 and 4 have deliberately been chosen slightly
conservative to reduce the risk that the derived probabilities
are unrealistically low. Coupled with the above considera-
tions on the lack of knowledge of actual values, it is indeed
likely that POF estimates are perhaps as much as an order
of magnitude wrong. Still, the precision is within the uncer-
tainty range that applies to many similar considerations for
manned aviation.
4 Conclusion
The application to the example Penguin C flight from Kold-
ing to Aalborg demonstrates how it is possible with the
proposed methodology to quantify an estimate of the POF
for a specific flight. The computations are fully parameter-
ized, and are thus easy to repeat for another flight path, for
another aircraft, for other wind parameters, etc. It is impor-
tant to note that the risk assessment here does not cover
all possible flight terminating events, as does it not include
midair collision and impacts with ground obstacles. Also,
there might be other event types depending on the type of
aircraft. However, it is relatively easy to include additional
events (which is certainly necessary for other aircraft types,
Table 6 Probabilities of
fatality per flight hour for the
two example flights
Ballistic Uncontrolled Parachute
decent glide descent Flyaway Joint
POF for original path per flight hour 1.1 · 10−7 2.2 · 10−7 2.7 · 10−7 4.7 · 10−8 6.5· 10−7
POF for modified path per flight hour 2.1· 10−8 2.5· 10−8 4.1 · 10−8 4.7 · 10−8 1.3 · 10−7
J Intell Robot Syst
such as rotorcraft). For approval of BVLOS flights this
method contributes in a tangible way to assist the authorities
in determining the risk associated with a given type of flight
operation, and as indicated above the Danish Transport,
Construction, and Housing Authority accepts this method as a
valid tool to anyone applying for permit to conduct BVLOS
operations in Danish airspace.
There remains substantial future work to improve and
refine the method, as well as including more events, and
more types of aircraft. Also, more accuracy on assumptions
will be beneficial for the resulting probabilities.
The Penguin C aircraft is picked at random for this
work. The author is not affiliated with UAV Factory. The
results cannot be used ‘as is’ for a quantitative correct
risk assessment of the aircraft since some of the aircraft
parameters most likely are not correct.
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